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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DON GERALD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

\'S.

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant.

J
ALLEN SCOTT, by and through his
Cnardian Ad Litem, Erma Lee Scott,
Plaintiff,

vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant .

.JEANETTE WALTON, Administratrix of the
Estate of Robert Walton, Deceased,
Plrn'.ntiff,

vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant.

BOYD SIMMONS,

Case
No.
11753

Plaintiff,

vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Aclministrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant.

ANGELO MELO, WAULSTINE McNEELY and
WILLIAM J. ROEDEL,
Plaintiff,

vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund,
Defendant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON REHEARING

STATEMENT OF CASE
This Petition for Rehearing is related specifically to the Jeanette Walton and Boyd Simmons cases
and involves the question of whether those two
cases involving claims arising after the c 1aim in
Worthen should be denied the benefit of Worthen.
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DECISION ON ORIGINAL HEARING
This Honorable Court reversed all of the consolidated cases by applying to them the rule of M.cConnel v. Commission of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P.2d
94 (1962).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Your Petitioners seek to have the Court reconsider its decision as it applies to the particular circumstances in the Walton and Simmons cases and
to reconsider the legally significant cut-off date.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Trial Court consolidated several cases for
appeal involving similar questions of law. Unfortunately, however, the dates with respect to each of
these cases were different. This Court in making its
decision may not have fully understood the set of
circumstances in the Walton case and the Simmons
case, whose claims both arose after the claim in
Worthen. To avoid any confusion with respect to the
dates of legal significance, Petitioners have enclosed on the last page of this Brief, a critical Time
Path Schedule comparing the important dates of
Worthen with those of Walton and Simmons.
The claim in Worthen arose on March 18, 1966,
the date the tortfeasor's carrier paid the settlement
check into Court, in trust, pending the outcome of
the dispute. Thereafter, the Insurance Fund (which
wasn't a party) voluntarily intervened to settle the
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dispute. On March 25, 1966, the District Court in
Worthen, ordered the Insurance Fund to pay its
proportionate share of the attorney fee. It was that
March 25, 1966 Court Order which this Court in
Worthen affirmed on April 3, 1967.
In Walton, the plaintiff received a Judgment in
the Federal District Court on November 22, 1964.
That decision was appealed to the Circuit Court of
Appeals which on August 31, 1966, affirmed the
Judgment. On December 21, 1966, plaintiff paid the
Insurance Fund under protest. Plaintiff thereafter
on January 20, 1969, filed suit against the Fund to
collect the amount paid under protest.
In Simmons, the plaintiff received a settlement
in the latter part of January, 1967. On January 31,
1967, the plaintiff paid the Insurance Fund under
protest, and on January 20, 1969, filed suit against
the Fund to collect the amount paid.
The right of the State Insurance Fund to be reimbursed at all is entirely dependent on; (1) there
being a settlement or a final Judgment; and, (2) a
fund created out of such settlement or judgment.
Those two conditions came into existance in Worthen on March 18, 1966, in Walton on December 21,
1966, and in Simmons on January 31, 1967. According to Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision of June
27, 1969, the above dates for Walton and Simmons
would constitute the date upon which the claim
arose and the Statute of Limitations would begin to
run.

4
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE LEGALLY
SIGNIFICANT CUT-OFF DATE.

Strictly speaking a "prospective opinion" is one
in which the new rule of law applies to future cases
only and not even to the case before the Court. The
April 3, 1967 Worthen decision was not a "prospective opinion" but had "limited retroactive effect"
because it was applied to the parties in that case on
a claim which arose on March 18, 1966.
It was unclear, however, the extent to which the
Worthen decision should be given retroactive effect
with respect to claims such as in the Walton and
Simmons cases which arose after the claim in
Worthen and which were not even the subject of
litigation until after the Worthen decision was announced.

Appellant in his brief has erroneously contended that the Supreme Court has "looked with favor
in having prospective application only." In determining whether to apply an overruling decision
retroactively in such situations the Supreme Court
has not discarded applying its decisions retroactively. In the most recent decisions, the Court has applied "limited retroactive effect" to the overruling
decisions as the Court did in Worthen. Instead of
arbitrarily applying the date of the overruling decision as the cut-off date, the Supreme Court has
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applied different cut-off dates with respect to those
events which occurred prior to any announcement
of a new rule or where litigation of such events was
not commenced until after the announcement of a
new rule.
The Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 20 Led 2d 1231
(1968), held that the new rule in American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 90 Led 1575 (1946), was
applicable to that case where litigation began after
the date of the American Tobacco decision, but involved conduct which had occurred prior thereto.
The Court emphasized that there was no such justifiable reliance as would warrant the American Tobacco decision to have prospective effect only.
The Supreme Court in Cipriano l'. Hauma, 395 U.S.
701, 23 Led 2d 647 (1969), announced the new rule
to the effect that it was unconstitutional to limit the
righ to vote in elections for approval of the issuance
of municipal utility bonds tc just property taxpayers. The Court applied the new rule to the parties
in that case and further extended the "limited retroactive effect" by stating that the new rule would
apply only where, under state law, the time for
challenging the election results had not expired, or
in cases which were brought within the time specified by state law for challenging the election and
which were not yet final.
The Supreme Court inLear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 23 Led 2d 610 (1969), likewise announced a new
rule by repudiating the doctrine that a patent
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licensee was estopped to challenge the validity of
a patent. The Court rejected the contention that the
new rule should not be retroactively applied to contracts concluded before the decision was announced.
Court have likewise in a number of tax cases
involving taxable events which occurred before the
time of an overruling decision, held that the overruling decision should be applied retroactively so
as to result in the imposition of taxes to an extent
which would not have been permitted while the
overruling case had not yet been overruled.Sunray
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F 2d 962 (10th Cir. 1945);
Cert. den. 325 U.S. 861, 89 Led 1982; Massaglia v .. Commiss;oner, 286 F 2d 258 (10th Cir. 1961); Legg's Estate v.
Commissioner, 114 F. 2d 760 (4th Cir. 1940).
The State Courts have likewise been flexible in
arriving at different cut-off dates based upon the
particular circumstances of each case. The Utah
Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Salt Lake County Sewerage
Improvement District No. I, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 P 2d 235
(1964) gave "limited retroactive effect" to that decision. In order to alleviate any fears the amicus had
in that case the Court indicated that Hamilton would
not effect "similar cases" where the issuance of
bonds had become fait accompli and the time for
protest under Utah Code Ann. § 17-6-3.11 (1953 as
amended) had expired. In effect the Court was applying that decision retroactively for those cases not
yet barred by the above Statute of Limitations.
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In Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Arizona
384, 381 P. 2d 107 (1963) the Court in a case involving a wrongful death action abolished the doctrine
of governmental immunity from tort liability and
applied that new doctrine to the facts in that case.
In doing so, the Court not only abolished the doctrine as to that case but also expressly abolished it
as to all pending cases, those not yet filed, those
which were not barred by the Statute of Limitations,
and as to all further causes of action.
In Scheele v. City of Anchorage, Alaska, 385 P 2d 582
(1963) the Trial Court granted Summary Judgment
for the City on grounds of governmental immunity.
The plaintiff in that case appealed contending that
the Court should have applied the prior decision of
Fairbanks v. Schaible, 357 P 2d 201, retroactively to him
despite the fact that the events which gave
rise to his claim occurred before the Fairbanks
decision was handed down. The Supreme Court accepted that argument and held the new rule of law
applied to those events which occurred before Fair·
banks was handed down, as well as all other pending cases, those not yet filed and not barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
It doesn't seem fair or logical to still approve
of Worthen, but yet apply McConnel to Walton and
Simmons whose claims both arose almost six (6)
months after the claim in Worthen and which
weren't even the subject of litigation until after
Worthen. This Court should discard the arbitrary
cut-off date of the Worthen decision. The Courts
present decision won't even reward the litigant who
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wins the race to the Courthouse since it is possible
one might have his case heard first but decided
after a case which was heard later. Prospective limitation of VJ orthen will retard judicial efficiency. It
will force judges to apply simultaneously two different rules - one of them acknowledged to be
"wrong" - to claims which arose at similar points
in time. We ask the Court to consider the following
problems which the Court's present decision creates:
In Worthen, this Court on April 3, 1967, affirmed the
District Court's March 25, 1966 decision setting forth
a new rule. In the future when District Courts apply
new rules which are appealed, must they await until
that decision is affirmed to apply that new rule
to other cases? If not, won't those cases to \vliich the
District Court subsequently applies the new rule be
reversed in the event this Court as in Worthen applies the new law only the overruling case itself
.:md not to cases arising thereafter?
POINT TWO
THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRE THAT THOSE
CASES SIMILARLY SITUATED RECEIVE EQUAL
TREATMENT.

Where a law is not being applied equally to
those governed by that law, the above constitutional
provisions require that any such disparity in treatment be reasonable. In application this means (1)
the classification must be a rational one bearing some
reasonable relationship to the object of the legisla-
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tion, and (2) that all persons within the classes established must be treated equally. In determining
whether the above constitutional provisions have
been violated the test is not the form in which the
state power has been applied but by whatever
forms, whether such power has in fact been exercised unfair1y.
The Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886) made it quite clear that not only must
a statute be non-discriminatory, but it must also be
applied in a non-discriminatory manner. In that case,
a statute provided that laundries in wooden buildings-as distinguished from brick or stone buildings
-could not be carried on without a license. The
classification itself appeared impartial and not unreasonable, but in application the licensing authority consistently refused licenses to Chinese applicants and granted licenses to non-Chinese. Since
the statute was being applied with an "unequal
hand" it was held to be in violation of the federal
"equal protection clause."
It is a fundamental requirement in our law that
like cases should receive like treatment, that there
should be no discrimination between one litigant
and another except based upon some relevant differentiating fact. This value of equality appears to
be at the heart of our notions of justice. Equality of
treatment to those similarly situated demands that
this Court which on April 3, 1967, applied the Worthen rule to a claim arising on March 18, 1966, apply
that same new rule to Walton and Simmons
whose claims arose after the claim in Worthen.
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POINT THREE
THE CONCURRING OPINION IS IN ERROR SINCE IT
IS BASED ON A NEW DEFENSE NOT EVEN ASSERTED BY APPELLANT AT TRIAL OR EVEN ON APPEAL.

The concurring opinion is based on a defense
which was never presented by the Appellant at
either the Trial Court level or on this appeal and
should therefore not be followed. This Court in
Teamsters Lo c fll Univn No. 222 v. W. S. Hatch Co.,

20 Utah 2d, 226; 436 P 2d 790 (1968) faced
cal defense which was urged for the first · ''H- on
appeal and rejected it summarily as being too late.
In the Hatch case, the dissenting opinion urged unsuccessfully that the Court should adopt the law as
set forth in 40 Am. Jur. § 155, as follows:
"Payments which are voluntarily made cannot
be recovered, but recovery may be had of payments made as the result of duress, fraud,
mistake, or failure bl consideration. In fact, it
has been said that lhese are the only grounds
upon which a suit to recover back money paid
may be maintained."

Not onlyi s the above referred to law being urged
too late, it in fact does permit recovery as a result
of duress, mistake, or failure
consideration. Had
the above defense been timely asserted the evidence would have established that Respondents
paymnts were not "voluntarily" made but instead
were coerced by the State Insurance Fund in return

itf
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for its agreement to endorse the settlement check
on which it was named a co-payee. The above common law statement is likewise not applicable for the
reason that Respondents claims are based on a specific statutory right
not a contractual right.
WHEREFORE, we respectfully petition this Honorable Court to reconsider its decision as it applies
to the speciaJ facts in Walton and Simmons whose
r:laims c1rose after the claim in Worthen.
Dated this 3rd day of March, 1970.
Respectfully submitted,
FORD G. SCALLEY
Attorney for Petitioners
Jeanette Walton and
Boyd Simmons
404 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TIME PATH COMPARISONS OF WORTHEN, WALTON, AND SIMMONS

WOIHHfN

WALTON

1965

*Settlement and
payment into Court
Mar. 18, 1966

Judgment obtained
Nov. 22, 1964

Appeal to Circuit Court

AccH:Jent suit
filed Feb. 15,
Wrong u eat
suit filed Federal
District Court
Feb. II, 1964

cc1 ent suit
filed Federal
District Court

SIMMONS

Mor. 30, 1965

* Date when claim arose in each case.

1str1ct

ourt or ere

Insurance Fund to
pay attorney fee
Mar. 25, 1966

App ea I ta S up rem e Court

Circuit Court affirmed
Judgment on
Aug. 31, 1966

Supreme Court affirmed
District Court Order
Apr. 3, 1967

*Payment under
protest to Fund

Dec. 21, 1966

*Sett ement an
payment to Fund
under protest
Jan. 31, 1967

Suit filed
against Fund
Jan. 20, 1969
Suit filed
against Fund
Jan. 20, 1969

